Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1961

State of Utah v. Max Leon Reay : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Ronald N. Boyce; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Reay, No. 9516 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3888

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plai!ntiff ood Respon,den_t- __,
-vs.-

·-·

·

.----------·-------c:~~rt:-·ut~~
, Sur:.' me
~.
r Case
No. 9516

MAX LEON REAY,
Defendoot a;nd Appell(J!Y/)t.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATURE OF CASE..............................................................................

Page
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL........................................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS..................................................................

2

ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................

3

POINT I.THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTITY AND TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S VERDICT ........................................................................

3

POINT II.THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND THE DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN BY HIS FAILURE TO EXCEPT TO THE INSTRUCTION ................................................

9

POIN III.THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL
CHARGE WAS READ TO THE JURY BEFORE THE
ROBBERY TRIAL ........................................................................

13

POINT IV.THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTIONS UPON THE CHARGE OF BEING AN
HABITUAL CRIMINAL..............................................................

16

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................

24

Authorities Cited
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sees. 362, 672................ 9, 14
11 ALR 2d 870, 875, 876 ........................................................................ 21, 22
23A C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1963................................................
17
McCormick, Evidence, pp. 117, 409 .................................................... 17,18
1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 126............................................
14
Cases Cited
Brown v. People, 124 Colo. 412, 238 P. 2d 847....................................
Carter v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465,
238 Pac. 259......................................................................................
Hardin v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 260, 85 P. 2d 332 (1939)....................
Jackson v. State, 308 P. 2d 323 (Okla.)............................................
Jenkins v. United States, 146 A. 2d 444..............................................
Jordan v. State, 218 Miss. 337, 67 So. 2d 371....................................
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Harpole, 175 Miss. 227,
166 So. 335 (1936)............................................................................
People v. Ahouse, 162 CA 2d 586, 328 P. 2d 227................................
People v. Clinesmith, 175 CA 2d Supp. 911, 346 P. 2d 923............

19
6
7
22
21
22
17
21
22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS -:- (~ontinued)
People v. Crawford, 128 CA 2d 699, 275 P. 2d 931 (Cal.)................
People v. Dodson, 77 CA 2d 389, 175 P. 2d 59·--------------------··-·-·--·······
People v. Gazelle, 299 Ill. 58, 132 N.E. 273 (1921)............................

P~ge

21
4
14

People v. Herod, 112 CA 2d 764, 247 P. 2d 127------··------···--·-----------22
Richfield v. Cottonwood Irr. Co., 84 Utah 107,
.
34 p: 2d 945 ( 1934,) -----------·-----------------------------------------···-----·--··---·-18
State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704 (1923) __________________________ 19, 20,21
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915)-------·-·-------·--·-··-····--12
State v. Berchtold, 11 _U~ah 208, 357 ~- 2d 183 (1960)----·---------·-:·
3
State v. Bruno, 69. Utah 444, 25& Pac. 109 {1927) ... _________________________ 19,20
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936)---·--------------------------··10
State v. Dodge, No. 9500, Nov. 1, 1961................................................
15
State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 P. 2d 175 ( 1934) -----------------------10
State v. Graham, 172 Kan. 627, 242 P. 2d 1067... ---------·-------------·--···
22
State v. G:reen, 78 Utah 580, .6 P. 2d 177-------------------------···---------------3
State v. Harris, 1 U. 2d 182, 264 P. 2d 284 (1953)----------------------C----3
State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 1?6, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957)---------------------------- · 10
State v. Keely, 52 Wash. 2d 676, 328 P. 2d 362--------·-·-----··---·---·----··
19
State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325,..17 P. 2d 919 (1933)-----------------------· 6,11
State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 558, 175 P. 2d 725 (1947) .... -------·
17
State v. Payne, 223 Mo. 112, 122 S.W. 1062 (1909)-----------------------19
State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504·-------··-----------------····10
State v. Rassum, 107 Utah 94, 152 P. 2d 88........................................
23
State v. Reed, 298 S.W. 2d 426 (Mo.)----------·--···------------------·-·------·-----·
·22
State v. Romprey, 399 S.W. 2d 746 (Mo.)---------------------------------------·
22
State v. Smith, 45 Uta}l 381, 146 Pac. 286 (1915)-------------------.--.-----· 9
State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383 .......• ---------------------.------23
State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959) ........,...................
3
State v. Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d 998 (1954)............................
23
State v. Wycoff, 27 N.J. Super 322, 99 A. 2d 365............................
22
State v. Zeimer, 10 U. 2d 45, 347 P. 2d 1111 (1960) ........................ 23,25
Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 (1801) ...............................,..................
18
Statutes Cited
Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
76-1-18 .............................................................................................. 1, 18
76-1-19 ............................... _................................................................
23
76-1-44 ..............................................................................................
12
76-26-1 ..............................................................................................
16
76-51-3 -------·-··············-··-···-··--------····--------------··-·························--·-···
1
12
77-21-39 ............................................................................................
77-21-42 ............................................................................................
12
77-37-1 ..............................................................................................
9
77-42-1 ..............................................................................................
10
Sponsored by the Utah
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 18
Rules
of Civil
Prnf'Pnn-rP.
R.nlP 44
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9516

MAX LEON REAY,
Defendant a;nd Appellant.

NATURE OF CASE
Defendant was convicted of assault with the intent
to commit robbery and with being a habitual criminal,
in violation of Sections 76-51-3, U.C.A. 1953 and 76-1-18,
U.C.A. 1953, respectively, upon trial by jury in the Third
Judicial District Court on April 5, 1961, and claims that
the insufficiency of the evidence and other irregularities
require a reversal of the convictions.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State of Utah contends the appellant's convic~
tions should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent will adopt the appellant's statement
of facts as being essentially correct, but will supplement
the facts therein presented where felt necessary in the
argument portions of its brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTITY AND TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.

PoiNT

II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND THE DEFENDANT
HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN
BY HIS FAILURE TO EXCEPT TO THE
INSTRUCTION.
PoiNT

III.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE WAS READ
TO THE JURY BEFORE THE ROBBERY
TRIAL.
2
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PoiNT

IV.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS UPON THE CHARGE
OF BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTITY AND TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
The defendant alleges that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to sustain a conviction of robbery, and complains specifically that there is insufficient evidence of
record to identify the defendant with the perpetration of
the crime. The determination of guilt or innocence based
upon the facts is usually a matter within the sole discretion of the jury. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d
177; State v. Harris, 1 U. 2d 182, 264 P. 2d 284, (1953).
An appellate court should not reverse a conviction unless
it appears from all the circumstances, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict, that the verdict was
unreasonable. State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 208, 357 P. 2d
183 (1960). The standard to be applied in reviewing the
instant case on appeal is noted in State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d
34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959), where the court said.
''The rules governing the scope of review on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict are well settled: that it is the
prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility
of the witnesses and to determine the facts; that
the evidence will be reviewed in the light most
3
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favorable to the verdict; and that if when so
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be
disturbed.''
Thus, for defendant to prevail, it must appear from
the record that the trial judge was unreasonable in
allowing the jury to pass on the guilt of the defendant,
and that in finding him guilty the jury acted unreasonably.
Identity in a robbery or assault with intent to commit robbery case may be proved like any other element
upon circumstantial evidence, People v. Dodson, 77 CA
2d 389, 175 P. 2d 59, and it is submitted that the evidence
in the instant case, when viewed with all its logical inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict, supports
the conviction.
The evidence of record shows that on Sunday night,
September 25, 1960, Ronald R. Eatchel, Assistant Manager of the Safeway Store, located at 370 East South
Temple in Salt Lake, closed the store at about 7 :05 p.m.
(R. 25). His wife Donna, had driven the family car to
the store to pick up her husband. After closing the store
and padlocking it, he and his wife went to their automobile that was parked in front of the store some 25 feet
away (R. 26). At that time, Arthur John Witchey approached the couple, pulled a gun from his pocket, and
ordered everyone back to store (R. 27). Mr. Eatchel was
able to convince Witchey that he couldn't open the store,
so Witchey and the couple returned to the car of Mr.
Eatchel (R 29).
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Eatchel testified that another car was parked behind
his in which Witchey and another person were riding,
and which followed Eatchel's car with the lights off down
Fourth East Street, after the latter refused to open the
store (R. 30). Eatchel testified that another person in the
robber's car was on the driver's side of the vehicle (R. 30).
Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Eatchel proceeded in their car
to the Police Station, where they reported the incident
(R. 31). Mrs. Eatchel, during the course of the incident,
was able to get the license number of the vehicle in which
Witchey and the unidentified person were riding. She
was also able to identify the color and make of the vehicle (R. 37). Mrs. Eatchel also testified that there was
another unidentified person in the vehicle that, at the
time of the incident, was sitting behind the steering
wheel, and that he might have been the one driving at
the time they were followed after leaving the store. Mr.
Eatchel further identified the gun that Witchey was carrying as a .22-caliber pistol.
At approximately 7:20 p.m. (R. 44), or fifteen minutes after the incident of the assault upon Mr. and Mrs.
Eatchel, Officer Michael C. Clark, a city police officer, observed the vehicle identified and reported by the Eatchels, facing east on Fourth South, where it was apprehended. The defendant, Max Leon Reay, was then behind
the driver's wheel of the vehicle, and Arthur Witchey
'vas on the passenger's side; a .22-caliber revolver was
also found in the vehicle at the time of apprehension.
5
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The only issue is whether, based upon this evidence,
a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Max Leon Reay was the unidentified occupant
of the vehicle at the time of the attempted holdup. The
State submits that a reasonable and proper inference
can be drawn, that, since it was shown that an unidentified man was present with the person who assaulted the
Eatchels in the attempted robbery, assisted Witchey by
driving the vehicle from the store, and in the short space
of 15 minutes was apprehended in the same vehicle, operating the vehicle, accompanied by Witchey, and with a
.22-caliber pistol in the vehicle, that the unidentified person was Max Leon Reay, and that, therefore, he was the
accomplice of Witchey. The short passage of time and the
presence of other factors identified with the commission
of the crime clearly support such an inference. The jury
could well feel the defendant's alibi to have been untrue
and concluded that he had always been present in the
vehicle. The inference is reasonable under the circumstances. The circumstances proved in the instant case are
clearly consistent with the inferences to be drawn. Carter
v. Sta;ndard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259.
The defendant's claim that evidence is insufficient
because of the standard applied in State v. Marasco, 81
Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919 (1933), misconstrues the insufficiency found in that case. In the Marasco case there was
no factual evidence present at the scene of the commission
of the crime that was later present with the defendant
that tended to connect the defendant to the scene of the
crime. Nor was the time element necessarily conducive
6
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to the inference sought to be drawn. In Marasco a mere
showing of flight plus motive existed. In the instant case,
three items: Witchey, the .22-caliber pistol, and the automobile were all found in the presence of the accused in the
short span of 15 minutes after the event, and it was additionally shown that Witchey was accompanied by an unidentified person, which person was in the driver's seat,
where the defendant was at the time of apprehension.
Marasco, in no way, supports a conclusion of insufficiency
in the instant case.
The defendant has contended that since he was not
identified at the scene of the commission of the crime
that identity is lacking. The State contends that the facts
surrounding the commission of the crime, when coupled
with other circumstances connecting the defendant to the
crime, clearly support a reasonable inference identifying
the defendant.
In Hardin v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 260, 85 P. 2d 332
(1939), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma had
before it a case similar to that now before the Court. The
court noted :
"While John Phillips was at the store with A. G.
Lamb one night two parties came into the store
and robbed Lamb of some money and a pistol.
Neither the prosecuting witness or John Phillips
could recognize the defendant as being one of the
parties that took part in the robbery. A car was
seen near the scene of the robbery after the parties
left the store, and before John Phillips and A. G.
Lamb got themselves released where the robbers
had tied them the car was driven away.
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* * *
''All of the evidence against the defendant * * *
is circumstantial.''
The only evidence identifying the accused was that he
pawned the pistol taken during the robbery. In addition,
a less positive identification of the get-away car was obtained, which did not directly connect the defendant. The
court further noted :
''The only circumstances upon which the state
relies to convict the defendant are the circumstances that on the 22nd or 23rd of December,
1935, after the robbery is alleged to have taken
place on December 6th, 1935, the defendant pawned
a pistol that was taken from the Lamb store to
Mrs. Bessie Templin, the witness who testified to
seeing the defendant leave her place with Tom
Carrick and Marvin Ward the afternoon or evening of December 6th, 1935.''
The defendant had set up alibi or at least non presence
similar to the instant case. The Oklahoma Court upheld
the conviction, noting :
"Where there is evidence from which the jury
would reasonably and logically find the defendant
guilty of the crime charged, in the absence of
unusual circumstances, this court will not set aside
the jury's verdict on account of insufficiency of the
evidence. * * *
''The evidence
judgment.''

sufficient

IS

to

sustain the

It is submitted, therefore, that no merit exists to the
contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the conviction.
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POINT

II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND THE DEFENDANT
HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN
BY HIS FAILURE TO EXCEPT TO THE
INSTRUCTION.
The defendant contends that the Trial Court erred in
giving Instruction Number 4 in which the court defined a
person who aids or abets the commission of a crime as a
principal. At the outset it should be noted that the defendant was represented by counsel at the trial and no
exception was taken to the instruction now sought to be
challenged on appeal. 77-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that
exceptions to instructions shall be ''taken and preserved
as in civil cases.'' The general rule is said to preclude a
review of instructions unless an exception has preserved
the contention for review on appeal. Thus it is noted in
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 672:
''The correctness of instructions given or refused
cannot be questioned in the appellate court unless
a timely exception was saved in the trial
court * * *."
The Utah cases have given force to this rule. In State v.
Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac. 286 (1915), it was said:
''So it would require hard struggling to defend
and support portions of the charge, both as to
substance and consistency * * *. But there is no
exception, no assignment, and no claim made as
to this nor to any portion of the charge. We thus
leave that."
9
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In State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 P. 2d 175
(1934), it was said:
''Other errors are assigned to instructions given
to the jury, but, as no exceptions thereto appear
of record, they, of course cannot be considered.''
Subsequent decisions have modified the strict exception rule noted above. Thus, in State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89,
60 P. 2d 952 (1936), it was said:
"We wish not to depart from the rule laid down
in this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on appeal errors relating to instructions or refusing
requests to instruct will not be considered or reviewed unless exceptions thereto were properly
taken by the party complaining. But in capital
cases and in cases of grave and serious charged
offenses and convictions of long terms of imprisonment, cases involving the life and liberty of the
citizen, we think that when palpable error is made
to appear on the face of the record and to the manifest prejudice of the accused, the court has the
power to notice such error and to correct the same,
though no formal exception was taken to the
ruling. * * * ''
Subsequent cases have also given recognition to the possible exception. Sta.te v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.
2d 504; Sta.te v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957).
The precedent, therefore, will excuse the failure to take
an exception if the error is palpable and so flagrant as
to deny a fair trial. 1
1

77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that even if error is committed
it will not be presumed to have affected the substantial rights of
the accused.

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Viewing the present instruction against the defendant's claim, it appears that no error was committed, and
even if a more articulate instruction could have been
given, the instruction in the instant case in no way deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The evidence clearly
discloses the need for such an instruction since the activities of the defendant were of the nature of an accomplice.
He aided Witchey by driving the car, and keeping lookout.
Such activities appear clearly to be those of the accessory
to the assault since he did not himself directly assault
the Eatchels. In addition, the defendant testified himself that he procured the car used in the crime. Although
defendant has noted that in State v. Marasco, supra, that
the court indicated that inconsistent evidence brought
out by an accused in support of alibi could not be used to
bolster the prosecution's case, the evidence in the instant
case relating to the procuring of the vehicle was not part
of the defendant's alibi nor in any manner inconsistent
with the defendant's theory of the case or the prosecution's. It would appear, therefore, that the instruction
was entirely proper.
Defendant contends that the trial judge failed to define the terms "aid and abet" and that this is, therefore,
error. This overlooks the direct evidence of record to the
contrary (R. 61, 77), and hence this contention is unmeritorious.
Finally, the defendant contends such an instruction
was error because the defendant was not charged as an
aider or abettor. The defendant correctly notes that one
11
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who aids and abets in a crime is a principal under Utah
law, 76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953, but apparently feels that defendant could not be such in the instant case because he
was not so charged, and relies upon Bta.te v. Bawm, 47
Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915), where the court noted the
defendant was charged directly as a principal. State v.
Baum is not good precedent for the claim since it was
decided in 1915 prior to the enactment of 77-21-39, U.C.A.
1953, which became law in 1935, and provides :
'' (1) Every person concerned in the commission of
an offense, whether he directly commits the offense
or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission even though not present shall be informed
against or indicted and tried and punished as a
principal.
'' ( 2) No other facts need be alleged in an information or indictment against an accused for procuring, counseling, aiding, or abetting the commission
of the offense than are required in an information
or indictment against the person directly committing the act constituting the offense.''
Thus it was proper to charge the defendant in terms of a
direct principal although the evidence shows him to act
as an aider. In fact, had the unnecessary aider language
been used it would have been mere surplusage. 77-21-42,
U.C.A.1953.
Under these circumstances, it does not appear that
the defendant's contention is meritorious since: (1) no
exception to the charge was taken and the charge as
given would not deprive the accused of a fair trial; (2)
the instruction was proper under the evidence ; ( 3) the
12
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instruction was proper as to the manner with which the
accused was charged.
PoiNT

III.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE WAS READ
TO THE JURY BEFORE THE ROBBERY
TRIAL.
The defendant contends that at his trial on the assault
with intent to commit robbery charge, the information
containing that charge and the habitual criminal charge
was read to the jury, and that this was error. The record
does not reflect a verbatim description of the actual reading. The record discloses the following entry made by
the reporter (R. 15) :

'' * * * The Clerk read the information filed by the
District Attorney in said case * * *.''
This is the complete record on the matter. From this excerpt the defendant contends the whole information was
read; the State submits it was not. The only case that
was then before the jury was the assault with intent to
commit robbery; therefore, the words "said case" apply
equally as well to support an inference that only that
part of the information relating to the robbery was read.
Three factors support this conclusion: First, certain pen
marks on the information are susceptible to an inference
that the clerk marked the second count so that it would
not be read (R. 8). Secondly, no objection was voiced
by counsel and hence we may conclude that no impro-
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priety took place. Third, the record reflects that after the
conviction on the robbery aspect of the case, the Judge
explained to the jury that there was an additional phase
to be considered, and the clerk read the information to the
jury concerning the habitual criminal charge (R. 67). All
of these factors support an inference that at the time of
trial on the robbery issue the habitual criminal count was
not brought before the jury. The record on the matter is
really not clear, and the inferences are more supportive
of a conclusion that the habitual criminal count was not
read than that it was.
Under such circumstances, a presumption of regularity arises. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed.,
Sec. 362. The great weight of authority is to the effect
that in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, it
will be presumed that judicial proceedings were regular
in all respects. People v. Gazelle, 299 TIL 58, 132 N.E.
273 (1921). Thus, it is said in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 126 :
''It is rebuttably presumed that the various phases
of a criminal prosecution have conformed to the
requirements of the law. * * *
''All judicial proceedings in courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to be correct and regular,
in the absence of proof to the contrary. * * *"
"Irregularities or error in the proceedings of
courts are never presumed, but must be affirmatively shown.'' (Emphasis supplied)
There is no affirmative showing that the second portion of the information relating to the habitual criminal
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charge was in fact read to the jury before the proper time.
The inferences are to the contrary and the presumption of
regularity overcomes any inference that error was
committed.
In addition, the State contends that even if the information relating to the charge of being an habitual criminal was read, that the defendant cannot now complain
because he raised no objection and proceeded to trial and
judgment without raising any protest. Certainly, under
such circumstances, where defendant was. represented by
experienced counsel, and knowing of possible error proceeds to trial, when timely objection could have possibly
corrected the matter, the defendant must be deemed to
have waived any objection or be estopped.
Finally, it is submitted that under the circumstances
it could not have prejudiced the defendant even if such
occurred since during the trial the defendant took the
stand and on cross-examination admitted the convictions
(R. 50, 56), which would have been read to the jury.
In State v. Dodge, No. 9500, Nov. 1, 1961, a similar
objection of prejudice was raised by a claim that an unsolicited answer of a witness disclosed previous crimes of
the accuseds. The court noted that on cross-examination
the accuseds admitted their convictions and said :
''Also, on cross-examination of appellants both admitted that they had been previously convicted of
felonies. Under such circumstances it is apparent
that the harm, if any, this statement could have
caused appellants was insufficient to warrant a
granting of a motion for a mistrial.''
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Certainly, in the instant case, where no objection was
raised, and subsequently the jury had before it similar
disclosures, even if the full information had been read,
it could not have prejudiced the defendant.
It is submitted that there is no basis for a claim of
error based upon an improper disclosure of the habitual
criminal information.
PoiNT

IV.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS UPON THE CHARGE
OF BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL.
The defendant finally contends that the trial court
erred in admitting Exhibits 3 and 4 without foundation to
further identify them with the accused. The nature of
the defendant's contention, however, is unclear since the
substance of his argument seems to go not only to the
issue of admissibility but to the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the conviction.
Exhibit 4 is a certified copy of the information and
commitment for the crime of forgery in violation of
76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, upon which a plea of guilty was entered on January 25, 1957, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County. Exhibit 3 was an exemplified copy of a
conviction and judgment for armed robbery on January
12, 1953 in the State of Idaho. The objection of the trial
defense counsel was only upon the theory that they were
not "the best evidence." No objection was raised that
insufficient foundation was laid or lack of identity. The
16
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objection was specific, and therefore, if it was not well
taken, the failure to raise an otherwise proper objection
will not overturn the case on appeal. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Ha.rpole, 175 Miss. 227, 166 So. 335 (1936).
Thus, McCormick, Evidence, p. 117, notes :
"Similarly, the overruling of an objection based
on an untenable ground, will not be overturned on
appeal on the basis that there was a tenable
ground for exclusion which could have been
urged.''
In 23A C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1963, it is said:
''Accordingly, an objection to evidence on specific ground will not raise the objection that it is
inadmissible on any ground other than that specified, since if the particular objection assigned is
not apt, the court will not be put in error for overruling it, although the evidence may be subject to
other objections."
The Utah Court has also adopted the requirement
that an objection on a specific ground, not proper, will
not suffice to exclude evidence and preserve the appeal
where another ground, had it been urged, would have been
proper. State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 558, 175 P. 2d 725
(1947). Therefore, unless the objection based upon the
"best evidence rule" is proper, the defendant may not
now claim error to admit the exhibits if otherwise
relevant.
In the instant case what was sought to be proved was
a previous conviction. Although some other evidence
rather than the record of conviction might be more per17
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suasive, this is not grounds for the best evidence
objection. The best evidence rule is applicable where the
thing to be proved is the contents of a writing. In McCormick, Evidence, p. 409, et seq, it is noted:
''The specific tenor of this requirement needs to
be definitely stated and its limits clearly understood. The rule is this: in proving the terms of a
writing, where such terms are material, the original writing must be produced, unless it is shown
to be unavailable for some reason other than the
serious fault of the proponent. * * * ''
In the instant case the Court was concerned not with
the proof of the contents of any writing, but with proof
of a conviction which happened to be recorded. See
76-1-18, U. C. A. 1953. Under these circumstances, the
"best evidence" rule was in no way applicable. If the
defendant had felt that identity evidence should be admitted first, the objection should have been to lack of
foundation or authentication. The specific objection made
by defense counsel was, therefore, error, and the matter is
not preserved for appeal.
Even if we assume that the objection made was sufficient to preserve the admissibility issue for appeal, the
defendant's contention is still unmeritorious. The records of conviction were properly authenticated in the
instant case and, therefore, admissible, if relevant. The
records were public records, and were properly certified
by the custodian and hence admissible. Richfield v. Cottonwood Irr. Co., 84 Utah 107, 34 P. 2d 945 (1934); Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 (1801); see also Rule 44,
U.R.C.P.
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The defendant's major contention as to the admissibility of the exhibits is the claim that there was insufficient showing to connect them with the defendant. The
defendant, in this regard, relies upon State v. Bruno, 69
Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 (1927). The defendant contends
that this decision requires more than a mere showing of
similarity of names. The defendant has confused the rule
of the Bruno case, since it in no way deals with the question of admissibility, but, rather, goes to the weight to be
given a showing of similarity of names. At this point it
is sufficient to point out that two properly authenticated
documents showing that a Max Leon Reay had been convicted of felonies and committed were proffered. The
defendant is also named Max Leon Reay, and the charge
is habitual criminality. It appears clear that the documents were, therefore, admissible. State v. Payne, 223
Mo. 112, 122 S.W. 1062 (1909); State v. Keely, 52 Wash.
2d 676, 328 P. 2d 362; Brown v. People, 124 Colo. 412, 238
P. 2d 847. The defendant has contended that the similarity of names was not sufficient to allow the exhibits to
be admitted. Neither, State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac.
704 (1923) nor Sta.te v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109
(1927), support the defendant's contention. Since defendant has also attacked the sufficiency of the evidence based
upon a lack of identity, an analysis of these cases will disclose the lack of merit in the defendant's argument. First,
it should be remembered that neither the Bruno case nor
the Aime case dealt with the evidentiary problem of admissibility of records of conviction, but rather, both cases
were concerned with substantive problems.
19
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In Aime, the defendant contended that the evidence
of a previous conviction was insufficient for the purposes
of sustaining an increased verdict in a liquor possession
case. The court noted:
''The matter of identity was submitted to the jury
as a fact to be determined by them from the evidence, under the usual instructions, and a verdict
of guilty as charged was returned."
The court further noted that:
''The proof consisted of the record of the previous
conviction of John Aime, in the justice's court of
the precinct where the defendant resided, of the
offense of manufacturing intoxicating liquor. No
additional evidence was offered to show the identity of defendant and the person described in the
record of conviction.''
The court held the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, and in so doing, noted :
"It is a general rule that identity of names
prima facie evidence of identity of persons.''

IS

Subsequently, in State v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256
Pac. 109 (1927), the defendant, Mary Bruno, challenged a
persistent violator conviction of the prohibition law. The
only evidence introduced was records of previous convictions showing that one Mary Bruno had been convicted.
The error found by the Supreme Court was not in the
admissibility of the records nor in their sufficiency, but
rather an instruction by the judge that the records con20
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elusively showed her conviction and that the jury must
regard that as prima facie evidence. The court noted the
Aime case and said :
''The Aime case is authority for submitting to the
jury in this case, with proper instructions, the
question of whether or not Mary Bruno who pleaded guilty to having intoxicating liquor in her possession as shown by the records of the city court
which were received in evidence. There is, however, a vast difference between holding that evidence is sufficient to sustmin a verdict and holding
that as a matter of law a given fact is established.''
(Emphasis supplied)
The court held that since the instruction took from
the jury their prerogative to find the facts, that it was
error. Neither Aime nor Bruno hold that identity of
names is not sufficient to admit records of previous conviction, nor that based upon such identity and records a
jury may not find the defendant guilty. In fact, both
cases seem to support a conclusion that this is at least
sufficient to put the matter before the jury, and where defendant offers no rebuttal, that a conviction may be
sustained. 2 Although there is some weight to the contrary, it would appear that the greater majority of cases
support the rule that identity of name is at least sufficient
to make out a prima facie case. 11 ALR 2d 870; People
Y.

Crawford, 128 CA 2d 699, 275 P. 2d 931 (Cal.); People

v. Ahouse, 162 CA 2d 586,328 P. 2d 227; Jenkins v. United
2

Although the annotation in 11 ALR 2d 870 seems to find a conflict between Aime and Bruno, this is a failure of the author to
comprehend the Bruno decision.
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Sta.tes, 146 A. 2d 444; Jordan v. State, 218 Miss. 337, 67
So. 2d 371; State v. Wycoff, 27 N.J. Super 322, 99 A. 2d
365; Jackson v. State, 308 P. 2d 323 (Okla.); State v. Reed,
298 S.W. 2d 426, (Mo.). It appears that California and
Missouri have both changed their former positions to one
supporting a conviction on the basis of identity of names.
People v. Clinesmith, 175 CA 2d Supp. 911,346 P. 2d 923;
State v. Romprey, 399 S.W. 2d 746 (Mo.). It is submitted,
therefore, that the evidence introduced, being unrebutted,
is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
In addition, it is noted that there is additional supportive evidence of record. The defendant took the stand
on the robbery charge, and there admitted the crimes,
dates and places that were the subject of the habitual
criminal charge (R. 50, 56). Under such circumstances,
the jury had before it the admission of the accused himself of his convictions and identity therewith. Under
these circumstances the accused's admission, plus the certified prior convictions, are more than sufficient to sustain
the conviction for being an habitual criminal. 11 ALR 2d
870, 875, 876. State v. Grah(JfJn, 172 Kan. 627, 242 P. 2d
1067; People v. Herod, 112 CA 2d 764,247 P. 2d 127.
The defendant's contention that the admissions made
during the robbery charge may not be carried over to the
habitual charge overlooks the general weight of authority
to the contrary. See cases collected 11 ALR 2d 875. It
also fails to comprehend the nature of the habitual criminal charge. This charge is not a crime, but a status ; it is
not presented to the jury during the principal charge,
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since conviction upon the principal charge is a prerequisite to consideration of the habitual status. The same jury
is used, 76-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, with two charges being considered, but only one trial. State v. Rassum, 107 Utah 94,
152 P. 2d 88; State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d
383. Since it is a status, not a crime, the accused is charged
with, and the same jury is involved, it would seem an
unnecessary formality to refuse to consider evidence of
which the jury is already possessed. 3
It is noted that in State v. Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d
998 (1954), that the defendant contended that it was error
to allow him to be impeached by showing prior convictions at the time of the principal charge, since this, it
was said, was evidence of his crimes tending to prove the
habitual criminal charge. The court did not say that the
impeaching evidence could not be used to support the
conviction; it merely said impeachment was still allowable, that the State still bore the burden of proof, and
then noted:
"It is to be noted that the state did not rely on
appellant's single admission of conviction, but
introduced proof by way of court records." (Emphasis supplied)
The court thus sustained the habitual criminal conviction
on the basis of the same evidence now before the Court.
It is also noted that in State v. Zeimer, 10 U. 2d 45,
347 P. 2d 1111 (1960), the Court held that the habitual
3

It is submitted that to hold to the contrary would duplicate evidence and thus to "march the King's troops up the hill in order
to march them down the hill."
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criminal portion of the trial is severable from the main
charge for the purpose of granting a new trial, so that
a new trial could be granted on the habitual criminal
charge alone. However, the Court was there clear to
note that the habitual criminal charge was not for a crime
but as to a status. There is nothing in the Zeimer case
to preclude using admissions made by the accused on the
main charge before the same jury to prove the habitual
charge.
It is submitted, therefore, that defendant's contention is unmeritorious since (1) improper .objection was
made at the trial to the admission of Exhibits 3 and 4, and
he may not now complain; (2) the exhibits were properly
admitted; (3) the defendant's identity was sufficiently
shown by similarity of names so as to make out a prima
f~cie

case upon which the jury could convict; (4) the

defendant's admissions support defendant's guilt on the
habitual criminal charge.

CONCLUSION
The defendant has suggested various alternative
forms of relief. It is submitted the defendant is entitled
to none of these requesets. The defendant's conviction
on the charge of assault with the intent to commit robbery
is fully sustained by the evidence, and no instructional or
other errors appear of record. The evidence amply supports the conviction of the defendant on the charge of
24
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being a habitual criminal. 4 Therefore, the Court should
affirm both convictions.
4

If error were committed as to the habitual criminal charge, reversal of
only that portion of the charge WOlflld be warranted. State v. Zeimer,
supra.

Respectfully submitted,
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